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This paper reports about a randomized ﬁeld experiment in which ﬁrst year eco-
nomics and business students at the University of Amsterdam could earn ﬁnancial
rewards for passing the ﬁrst year requirements within one year. Participants were
assigned to a high, low and zero (control) reward group. The passing rate and the
numbers of collected credit point are not statistically diﬀerent across the three
groups. We do ﬁnd some evidence for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. In par-
ticular, high ability students and students from higher social backgrounds have
higher passing rates and collect more credit points when assigned to (higher)
reward groups. Students in the reward groups, however, do not report to have
studied more hours.
Keywords: ﬁnancial incentives, student achievement, randomized social experi-
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JEL Codes: I21, I22, J241. Introduction
Universities in the Netherlands are public and the system of university education
is characterized by low tuition fees. Undergraduate students collect credit points
by passing exams, which are graded on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). To
pass an exam a score of at least 6 is required. When students fail an exam (score
below 6), they do not collect any credits until they pass a make-up exam. Failing
an exam is common, and many students do more than one make-up exam for the
same course before passing. As a consequence, most students do not graduate
within the nominal duration of the program (4 years). Delay typically starts in
the ﬁrst year. Moreover, for teachers the system of failing and passing exams
implies much grading since they often grade multiple exams of a student for the
same course.
The share of undergraduate students in economics and business at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam who pass all ﬁrst year requirements within their ﬁrst academic
year is in the vicinity of 0.20 (ranging between 0.17 and 0.22 in the last ﬁve years).
For the Department of Economics and Business this low passing rate is a concern
since public funding depends among other things on the number of credits points
awarded each year. Moreover, once a year a Dutch weekly magazine (Elsevier)
publishes a ranking of university departments in each ﬁeld aimed at secondary
education students who are in the process of choosing their university education.
The ﬁrst year passing rate is one of the inputs of this ranking.
During the past years the department has tried to improve the ﬁrst year pass-
ing rate by introducing extra guidance by older students, increased teaching hours
and more intensive courses. Passing rates have, however, not increased. The idea
is that without additional eﬀort from students passing rates will remain low, and
1that to improve the passing rates policy should aim at increasing students’ eﬀort.
In this paper we study ﬁnancial incentives as an instrument to achieve this.
A clear indication that ﬁnancial incentives may have substantial eﬀects on
achievement comes from a study held in the academic year 1999/2000 at the
University of Amsterdam. At the beginning of the third trimester, all ﬁrst year
students who followed the undergraduate program in econometrics were promised
a reward of E454 (1000 Dutch guilders) upon fulﬁlling all ﬁrst year requirements
before the start of the new academic year.1 In the year that this reward was
in place, the passing rate was 0.50, while in the previous year this was 0.28
(cf. Hilkhuysen 2000). Those involved in the design and evaluation of this study
attributed this increase of the passing rate to the reward. While the 0.22 increase
in the passing rate may be the causal eﬀect of the reward, this need not be the
case. Plausible alternative explanations for the increased passing rate are a higher
quality of the student cohort, less demanding courses, and less strict grading of
exams. Given the design of the study it is diﬃcult to establish a causal relation
between the ﬁnancial incentive and the increased passing rate. Nevertheless the
results suggest that a ﬁnancial incentive may be a very eﬀective intervention.
In this paper we explore this further by reporting on a ﬁeld experiment where
ﬁrst year undergraduate students in economics and business at the University of
Amsterdam were randomly assigned to three groups. Students assigned to the
’high reward’ group were promised a bonus of E681 on completion of all ﬁrst year
requirements by the start of the new academic year. Students assigned to the
’low reward’ group were promised a bonus of E227 for this achievement. Students
assigned to the control group could not earn a reward. Such a randomized exper-
iment should provide a more convincing estimate of the causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial
incentives on students’ achievement than the related study among econometrics
2students discussed above.
To our knowledge, Angrist and Lavy (2002) is the only other study to date
that analyzes the eﬀects of ﬁnancial rewards on students’ achievement in an
experimental setting.2 They evaluate the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives on
obtaining secondary education matriculation in Israel. They implemented two
experiments targeted at low-achieving students. Their ﬁrst (pilot) experiment
randomized 489 students within schools, of which 248 students were assigned to
the treatment group. Treated students could earn a reward of $800 in cash (or
$1000 to $1200 in education vouchers) upon completing their secondary education
matriculation certiﬁcate. To obtain the support of school administrators, the
randomization favored potentially low-achieving students toward the treatment
group. Using instrumental variables estimation, Angrist and Lavy do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reward on achievement.
Their second (follow-up) experiment is a school-based experiment in which 20
out of 40 entire schools (with low matriculation rates) are assigned to treatment.
According to the original design, students in treated schools could earn up to
$2500 in cash during a three-year period. However, the program was abolished
after one year. As a result students in grades 10 and 11 could earn at most
$500 and students in grade 12 at most $1500. Angrist and Lavy (2002) ﬁnd that
treated schools have matriculation rates of 6-8 percentage points higher than
untreated schools.3
A feature that the experiment in this paper has in common with the ﬁrst
experiment of Angrist and Lavy (2002) is that randomization takes place within
the educational institution. Reward sizes are also of similar magnitude. Unlike
Angrist and Lavy, who faced reluctant school administrators, we were in the
position to implement a genuine randomized assignment. Moreover, we collected
3information about students’ study eﬀort. This permits us to also examine the
impact of the rewards on eﬀort.
To brieﬂy summarize our results, for the full sample, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of
the rewards on achievement measured by passing rates and numbers of collected
credit point. Our results suggest that the absence of an eﬀect on achievement
can be attributed to students not spending more time on their study. While
the average treatment eﬀect is approximately zero, we ﬁnd some evidence for
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. In particular, students with high math skills and
students with higher educated fathers have higher passing rates and collect more
credit points when assigned to (higher) reward groups. While reported study
time for these groups is not aﬀected by treatment status, these students claim
that they have studied harder as a consequence of the rewards. The positive eﬀect
for students with good math skills suggests that the average treatment eﬀect is
negligible not because the average student is unresponsive to ﬁnancial incentives
but because the requirements for the rewards are too demanding for the average
student when compared to the size of the (uncertain) reward.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
relevant background information about the Dutch system of higher education and
of the economics and business program at the University of Amsterdam. Section
3 explains the design of the ﬁeld experiment and describes the data. Section 4
presents and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes.
42. Background
2.1 The Dutch system of university education
University education in the Netherlands is accessible for all students with a qual-
iﬁcation from the pre-university track in secondary education.4 This secondary
education qualiﬁcation can only be obtained by passing a uniform nationwide
exam. The relevant secondary education exit requirements are set such that they
are considered to be suﬃcient university entry requirements, and therefore all
students starting a university education in economics or business are supposed
to be capable of actually graduating (given that they exert suﬃcient eﬀort).
In the academic year 2001/2002 there were 34,200 ﬁrst year students at Dutch
universities, which is about 17 percent of the relevant birth cohort. Some uni-
versity studies (such as economics, history or mathematics) may require speciﬁc
courses to be included in the secondary education curriculum. Apart from this,
universities are not permitted to select students; everyone who applies with a
valid entry qualiﬁcation has to be admitted.5 In the Netherlands selection there-
fore takes place at the exit of secondary education as opposed to at the entry of
higher education.
Currently six Dutch universities oﬀer an undergraduate program in economics
and business.6 While the programs oﬀered by the diﬀerent universities diﬀer
somewhat, they are considered to be close substitutes. They attract students
from the same pool of secondary school graduates and they prepare their students
for the same labor market, although people tend to stay in their region of origin.
Oosterbeek et al. (1992) compare the labor market outcomes of graduates from
the diﬀerent economics and business departments in the Netherlands and ﬁnd
that selection corrected wage diﬀerentials are modest.
5University students in the Netherlands who are younger than 30 and sub-
scribed as full-time students are all charged the same tuition fee of E1,329.57 per
year (in the academic year 2001/2002). The tuition fee is set by the government
and does not vary by ﬁeld of study or by university. There is also a uniform ﬁnan-
cial aid system that applies to all university students. The ﬁnancial aid scheme
consists of three components that students are entitled to for a maximum of four
years. The ﬁrst component is a basic grant of E211 per month for students who
do not live with their parents and E69 per month for those students who do.
The second component is an additional grant decreasing with parental income.
The maximum size of this additional grant equals E222 per month. The third
component is a loan. The maximum amount of this loan equals E456 per month.
An important feature of the basic grant and the additional grant is that they
become loans if a student fails to collect enough credit points. Grants received
during the ﬁrst study year are not transformed into a loan if the student earns
at least half of the nominal number of credit points of the ﬁrst year or if the
student obtains a higher education diploma within 10 years. The requirements
for the grants not to turn into a loan are therefore not very demanding. In our
population of economics students 58% of our population (see below) collects at
least half of the credit points. Furthermore, of a given cohort of students over
80% will actually graduate within 10 years. Recall that the ﬁnancial rewards
in the experiment are only paid if a student collects all credit points, therefore
the ﬁnancial aid system of the government does not interfere with our ﬁnancial
rewards.
The complete loan plus interest (from the month of payment onward) must
be repaid within 17 years after graduation. People with annual earnings below a
certain threshold are exempted from repayment. Otherwise repayment is in ﬁxed
6amounts independent of income. The loan component of the ﬁnancial aid scheme
is not very popular among Dutch students. Students typically use the basic grant
and the additional grant, but of the total amount available for loans less than 20
percent is requested. This is reﬂected in the fact that many university students
combine studying with some hours of paid work. In our sample around 80 percent
of the students work, and they work on average around 12 hours per week (details
concerning data collection are provided later).
2.2 Undergraduate program in economics and business at the University of Am-
sterdam
The undergraduate program in economics and business at the University of Ams-
terdam is a 4 year program. In the ﬁrst academic year, which runs from Septem-
ber until August, all students in economics and business follow exactly the same
program of 14 compulsory courses. The ﬁrst year program was divided into three
trimesters of 14 weeks each in the year that the experiment was conducted. Every
trimester ended with exams shortly after the courses ﬁnished and the make-up
exams are organized in the last week of August. The ﬁrst academic year thus
consisted of 42 study weeks, which are allotted to diﬀerent courses in the form
of credit points.7 It is only after the ﬁrst trimester of their second academic
year that students choose diﬀerent packages of courses to specialize either in eco-
nomics or in business (there are also various sub-specializations within economics
and within business)
Students typically surpass the nominal study duration of 4 academic years
before obtaining their undergraduate degree. The delay of their study often
starts already in the ﬁrst year and passing rates are correspondingly low. For the
Department of Economics and Business this is costly since the internal funding
7scheme of the University of Amsterdam is primarily based on the number of credit
points that students obtain. Delay, which manifests itself in make-up exams and
repeated attendance of the same courses, represents a net loss for the department
because it increases the costs while no extra compensation is received.
3. Experimental design and data
As mentioned above, the experiment was motivated by the experience from
an earlier study among econometrics students at the University of Amsterdam.
When we proposed to run a randomized experiment, student representatives ar-
gued that experimentation with students is unethical and that the money involved
with the experiment beneﬁted only a small portion of all students of the depart-
ment. Some of our colleagues supported this view. Nevertheless the dean of
the department decided in favor of conducting the experiment under the require-
ment that participation ought to be voluntary. Voluntary participation was also
necessary to obtain students’ permission to access their records in the student
administration.
In the experiment the rewards are tied to passing all exams before the second
academic year starts. The ﬁrst year passing rate is therefore the prime outcome
variable of interest. We also consider the number of credit points collected by
the students. Not only is it a relevant outcome measure since internal funding at
the University of Amsterdam depends on this, but if the rewards give students
an incentive to spend more eﬀort on their study, we expect the number of credit
points to increase also for students who do not pass all requirements. Note that
since all courses in the ﬁrst year are mandatory, students in the treatment groups
cannot opt for less demanding courses.
8The experimental design includes, beside the control group, a high reward
group and a low reward group. The reward sizes of the high and low reward
groups are E681 and E227, which is 11
2 and 1
2 times the size of the E454 reward in
the earlier study among econometrics students. Given the substantial increase in
the passing rate attributed to the earlier E454 reward, the rewards in the present
experiment seem suﬃciently large to increase passing rates. At the same time,
the size of these rewards are such that it would be feasible for the government
or the university to implement the reward scheme if indeed the rewards result in
higher passing rates and/or more realized credit points. The distinction in a high
and low reward group allows us to distinguish between the eﬀect of being treated
as such, and the eﬀect of the size of the reward. If both rewards induce the same
eﬀect, the amount of the reward is apparently not important within this range. If
the high reward induces a larger eﬀect than the low reward, it apparently matters
how much can be earned.
To ensure that all students were treated identically, participation in the ex-
periment was only open to students who (i) followed the full-time program, (ii)
did not claim more than 1 credit point dispensation,8 and (iii) did not start the
economics and business program in a previous year. The total number of eligible
students equals 254.
On October 1 2001, almost one month after classes started, we sent all ﬁrst
year students a letter inviting them to participate in the experiment. This was
the earliest possible date given the availability of addresses from the student
administration. The letter explained the purpose of the experiment and informed
students that participants would be randomly assigned to three equally sized
groups with equal odds for all students. Furthermore the letter explained that
participation implied that the student granted the researchers permission to link
9information from the experiment to information from the student records about
their achievements. Students received a ﬁxed payment of E22.69 (50 Dutch
guilders) upon participation. Notice that this procedure reveals clearly that no
participant looses from the experiment. Everyone receives a small payment and
everyone faces equal probabilities to be assigned to one of the reward groups.
After a reminder and a telephone round 249 eligible students participated in the
experiment, which is 98% of all eligible students. Three students could not be
reached and 2 students explicitly rejected participation.
In the random assignment 83 students were assigned to the high reward group,
84 students to the low reward group, and 82 students to the control group. On
November 29, letters were sent informing participants about their assignment
status. The ﬁrst exam was on November 28, the second on December 12 and the
third on December 19.
Students had to ﬁll out and sign a participation form which also included a
short questionnaire. This questionnaire collected information about respondents’
mathematics grades in secondary school and their parents’ education.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the background characteristics of
the complete sample and for diﬀerent subgroups. We distinguish two types of
parental education, low and high, where high refers to all higher education, both
university and vocational. Dutch pre-university secondary education oﬀers two
programs in mathematics: mathematics A and mathematics B. Mathematics A
is considerably less advanced than mathematics B. Students are allowed to do
exams in both programs, but it is not compulsory to do mathematics A in order
to do mathematics B. Table 1 reports the shares of students who did exam for
mathematics A only, for mathematics B only, and who did both mathematics A
and B. Recall that exams are graded on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).
10The random assignment was done by stratifying the participants on the basis of
their mathematics results and their parents’ education. This precludes that the
random assignment procedure accidentally results in groups that diﬀer in these
observed characteristics.
The pre-assignment questionnaire also asked participants their subjective
probability of fulﬁlling the requirement of passing all exams within the ﬁrst aca-
demic year if they would be assigned to the control group, the low reward group
and the high reward group respectively. This was done to get some indication of
the eﬀect of the rewards before the experiment actually took place. The average
expected probabilities are reported in the bottom part of Table 1. Without a re-
ward the expected passing rate equals 0.55. Given the actual passing rates from
previous years of around 0.20, students seem overly optimistic at the beginning of
their study. If students would be entitled to the low reward the expected passing
rate increases to 0.63, and it increases to 0.71 for the high reward. This implies
that ex-ante the students expected quite sizable eﬀects from the rewards. No
diﬀerences are observed across groups.
After the experiment ended a second questionnaire was sent to all participants.
Upon completion, students received a payment of E25. In total 234 participants
responded, which is 94% of all participants. This post-experiment questionnaire
asked questions concerning students’ current study status, the time they spent
on their studies during the past year, their work activities during the past study
year, their perceptions of the eﬀect of the reward on their eﬀort (if assigned to
one of the reward groups), and possible supplementary rewards oﬀered by third
parties. We discuss the results below.
The sample size is not very large, which has implications for possible diﬀer-
ences in passing rates between the groups that can be distinguished. To inves-
11Table 1: Sample means of background characteristics (stratiﬁed by groups)
All High Low Control
Education father
Higher education 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.54
Lower education 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Education mother
Higher education 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.37
Lower education 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.62
Only math A
Share 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.59
Grade 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8
Only math B
Share 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.19
Grade 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.3
Both math A and math B
Share 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.18
Grade math A 7.7 8.1 7.4 7.9
Grade math B 6.3 6.0 6.4 6.4
No math
Share 0.02 0 0.01 0.04
Subjective probability to pass ﬁrst year if assigned to ...
- High reward 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.71
- Low reward 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.63
- Control 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.55
N 249 83 84 82
Note: Higher parental education includes university education
and higher vocational education, lower parental education in-
cludes all other types of education.
12tigate the statistical power we have performed some simulation studies (with a
signiﬁcance level equal to 0.05). Assuming a passing rate for students in the
control group of 0.20 (which roughly coincides with historical passing rates), we
investigate three possible situations.
First, assume that the rewards aﬀect the passing rates of high reward group
twice as much as the passing of the low reward group. The statistical power of a
chi-square test for the null hypothesis that all groups have similar passing rates
against the alternative hypothesis that each group has a diﬀerent passing rate is
about 0.5 if the passing rate of the high reward group becomes 0.31 (the passing
rate in the low reward group is then 0.26). The power is about 0.8 if the passing
rates in the high and the low reward group become 0.37 and 0.29 respectively.
Second, consider the case where the reward aﬀects the passing rates, but the
size of the reward is irrelevant, i.e. the passing rates of both reward groups are
similar. To obtain a statistical power of 0.5 of a chi-square test for the null
hypothesis that all groups have the same passing rates against the alternative
hypothesis that the passing rates in the reward groups diﬀer for passing rates
in the control group, the passing rates in the reward groups should increase to
0.30. For a statistical power of 0.8, the passing rates for the reward groups should
increase to 0.35.
Finally, if the reward only aﬀects the students in the high reward group, for a
statistical power of 0.5, the passing rates in the high reward group should increase
to 0.32 and for a power of 0.8 this passing rate should become 0.37. From these
calculations it is clear that the increase in passing rates necessary to obtain some
reasonable statistical power is well within the 0.22-increase in passing rates that
was found in the earlier study among econometrics students.
13Table 2: Outcomes by group
All High Low Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Passing rate 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.20
(0.026) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Credit points 23.0 23.3 22.7 23.1
(0.95) (1.65) (1.65) (1.67)
Note: Mean values, with their standard errors in parentheses.
4. Results
4.1 Achievement
In Table 2 we report the ﬁrst year passing rates and the average numbers of credit
points for the full sample and for every treatment group. The passing rate of the
high reward group is 0.03 higher than that of the low reward group and of the
control group. However, the diﬀerences between the groups are not statistically
signiﬁcant. The p-value of a chi-square test for the null hypothesis that students
in all three groups have identical passing rates against the alternative hypothesis
that passing rates diﬀer between groups equals 0.83. The p-value of this test
against the alternative hypothesis that only individuals in the high reward group
have diﬀerent passing rates equals 0.54.9
Students in the control group collected on average 0.4 credit points more than
students in the low reward group and 0.2 points less than students in the high
reward group. Figure 1 shows the frequency distributions of the numbers of credit
points for each of the three groups. The shapes of the three distributions are very
similar. All three are bi-modal with the highest peak near 42 points and a second


































Figure 1: Distribution of total credit points collected by group
of the groups equals 0.97, indicating that there are no diﬀerences between the
number of credit points collected by the diﬀerent groups.
Finally, Figure 2 shows the average numbers of credit points per group accu-
mulated over the course of the study year. The patterns are basically identical.
The ﬁrst key ﬁnding of this paper is therefore that the average treatment eﬀect
of the ﬁnancial rewards on students’ achievement is zero. This contradicts the
ﬁnding of the earlier study among econometrics students.10
4.2 Eﬀort and time allocation
The eﬀect of rewards on achievement is a reduced form eﬀect. It does not disen-
tangle the eﬀects of rewards on eﬀort and subsequently of eﬀort on achievement.
To examine whether the zero eﬀect of rewards on achievement is the result of
the rewards having no impact on eﬀort or the result of extra eﬀort having no















































Figure 2: Average numbers of credit points collected during the academic year
by group
The post-experiment questionnaire included the following questions:
• “How many hours per week did you on average spend on your study in
economics and business during each of the three trimesters of the past
academic year (2001/2002)? (We want to know the total average time
spent on your study, this means including following and preparing lectures
and courses and preparing exams.)”
• “How many hours did you spend in total on preparing make-up exams held
in August? (Here we want to know the total number of hours, not the
average per week.)”
Information about study time is provided in the ﬁrst block of Table 3.
In all three groups, average study time is around 22.5 hours per week during
the ﬁrst trimester and decreases to around 18 during the second trimester and
16Table 3: Time allocation by group
All High Low Control
Time spent on study
First trimester (per week) 22.5 21.1 22.9 23.7
(0.8) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Second trimester (per week) 18.2 18.2 17.7 18.9
(0.8) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Third trimester (per week) 16.6 16.1 16.9 16.8
(0.8) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
Summer period (total) 27.4 30.5 22.5 29.5
(2.3) (4.1) (3.9) (4.1)
Eﬀort increased as result of reward 0.37 0.21
Paid job
Share 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.76
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Hours worked (per week) 12.1 11.5 12.4 12.5
(0.5) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0)
Wage rate (in E) 7.60 7.22 7.88 7.69
(0.17) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31)
Member student association 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.23
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Living at parents’ house 0.52 0.49 0.59 0.48
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Note: Sample means. Standard errors in parentheses.
1716 to 17 during the third trimester. Students spend on average around 27 hours
to prepare their make-up exams during the summer. Quite a few students report
that they do not spend time at all on their study, which inﬂuences the averages
for the second and third trimesters and for the summer period. These are the
students who dropped out and for the summer period also students who did no
make-up exams.11 Average time spent on the study is very similar across groups,
and only for the summer period average study time is highest for the high reward
group. Diﬀerences across groups are not substantial nor statistically signiﬁcant.
We are aware that the questions about study time measure actual eﬀort only
imperfectly. The responses are subjective and retrospective, and only measure
time input and not the eﬀective input per hour. While biases due to this may
cancel out in across group comparisons, it is desirable to have additional in-
formation about study eﬀort. The questionnaire therefore also included items
concerning perceived increase in eﬀort due to the reward, time spent on paid
work, whether respondents joined a student association and whether they lived
with their parents. Results are also reported in Table 3.
Thirty-seven percent of the participants who were actually assigned to the
high reward group respond ex-post that the reward increased their study eﬀort.
In the low reward group this percentage equals 21. These two percentages are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Hence, in the students’ perception the
rewards did not only aﬀect study eﬀort but also the size of the reward seems to
matter.
Approximately 80 percent of the students combine studying with work, and
those who work spend around 12 hours per week on this activity and earn on
average E7.50 per hour. Here, we see no diﬀerences between the reward and
control groups with the exception that students in the high reward group tend to
18earn somewhat lower wage rates than students in the other two groups. Finally,
the last two rows of Table 3 reveal that the rewards did not withheld students
from joining a student association or from moving out of their parents’ house.
To summarize, the results on the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial rewards on eﬀort levels
are somewhat mixed. On the one hand we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between groups
in reported study time and other time allocation variables. It seems that many
students prefer to combine work and study above devoting more time to their
study. The rewards apparently do not change this preference and students do
not shift time from work or leisure to their study. This result is consistent with
the ﬁrst ﬁnding that rewards do not aﬀect achievement.12 On the other hand,
students’ own perceptions point to increased eﬀort by students in the reward
groups, with a larger increase for higher rewards. Of course, these perceptions
may be wrong and the answers may just reﬂect some socially desirable response.
But it may also be the case that these responses reﬂect some genuine diﬀerences
in exerted eﬀort (per hour). If the latter is true, we must conclude that the rise
is insuﬃcient to increase the average student’s achievement.
4.3 Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
So far we implicitly assumed that rewards aﬀect all students identically. However,
there are good reasons to expect that some students will be more responsive
to a reward than others because of heterogeneity in the marginal cost of eﬀort
or heterogeneity in returns. Two student characteristics that seem particularly
relevant in this respect are social background and ability.
Students from a poor social background may face credit constraints due to
which they cannot aﬀord a reduction of the time they work for pay. Consequently,
these students are less likely to respond to the rewards than students from with
19more favorable social backgrounds. Students of high ability collect more credit
points when there is no reward than low ability students and therefore have to
bridge a smaller gap when a reward is promised. Moreover, high ability students
earn more extra credits points with a given increase of their eﬀort than low ability
students. Consequently, high ability students are more likely to respond to the
rewards than low ability students.
Let us ﬁrst investigate to what extent the eﬀect of the rewards depends on
social background. We use the level of fathers’ education as a measure of social
background and split the sample in 133 students whose fathers completed at least
higher education, and 116 students whose fathers do not have a higher education
degree. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show the passing rates and the number
of credit points collected for both subsamples conditional on treatment status.
Of those whose fathers are higher educated, the students in the high reward
group have a higher passing rate and they also collect more credit points than
the students in the low reward group and the control group. In this subsample
students in the high reward group thus tend to perform somewhat better than
students in the other groups. Within the subsample of students whose fathers
completed less than higher education the students in the high reward group do
not have higher passing rates, nor do they collect more credit points than students
in both other groups.
Next consider student ability. As an indicator for ability we use the secondary
school math grades of the students. We split the sample in two: students with
good math skills and students with poor math skills. We consider a student to
have good math skills if either his secondary school grade for math A was 8 or
higher or the grade for math B was 6 or higher. 107 students enter the high math
skill group and 142 students the low math grade group. The passing rates and
20Table 4: Outcomes by group and students’ background characteristics
Father’s education Math grade
All High Low High Low
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Passing rate
- High reward 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.45 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)
- Low reward 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.39 0.09
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)
- Control 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.33 0.09
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Credit points
- High reward 23.3 25.2 20.9 32.8 17.0
(1.7) (2.3) (2.4) (2.2) (2.1)
- Low reward 22.7 20.1 25.6 29.5 18.8
(1.7) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.0)
- Control 23.1 21.6 24.7 28.1 19.1
(1.7) (2.3) (2.4) (2.1) (2.2)
Note: Sample means with their standard errors in parentheses.
21the average number of credit points collected for both subsamples diﬀerentiated
by reward and control groups are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.
Of those with high math skills, the students in the high reward group have
higher passing rates and collect more credit point than those in the low reward
group, who in turn perform better than those in the control group. Within the
low math skills group diﬀerences between reward groups and control group are
not very pronounced.
Due to the rather small sizes of the various sub-samples, the reward eﬀects
within the high social background and high ability sub-samples are not very
precisely measured and lack statistical signiﬁcance. Nevertheless, the patterns
nicely concur with our expectations. Especially the eﬀects of rewards for students
with high math skills seem substantial and reveal a monotonic pattern. Without
a reward, these students earn on average 28 credit points, and every E227 reward
increases their average number of credit points by 1.5.
Because high ability students and students with higher social background
have higher achievement if a (higher) reward is promised, we also expect them
devote more time on their study. The results in of Table 5 lend no support for
that. The ﬁrst two blocks present information on study time broken down by
sub-samples and treatment groups. For conciseness we report the average weekly
study time during the three trimesters. Study time during the summer period
is reported separately. Within each of the four sub-samples we observe virtually
no diﬀerences in average weekly study time between reward and control groups.
There are some diﬀerences in the amounts of study time during the summer
especially for students with a lower parental education background. None of
these diﬀerences is, however, statistically signiﬁcant.
The bottom part of Table 5 gives - again by sub-sample and reward size -
22Table 5: Study time and eﬀort by treatment and students’ background
Father’s education Math grade
All High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average weekly study time trimesters 1-3
- High reward 18.4 18.0 19.0 19.0 18.1
(1.2) Eﬀort (1.6) (1.7) (1.6)
- Low reward 19.2 18.7 19.7 19.7 18.9
(1.1) (1.7) (1.5) (1.7) (1.6)
- Control 19.8 18.3 21.4 19.6 19.9
(1.2) (1.8) (1.6) (1.6) (1.7)
Study time during summer period
- High reward 30.5 25.3 37.4 22.0 36.2
(4.1) (4.9) (6.9) (4.6) (6.0)
- Low reward 22.5 20.0 25.1 22.3 22.6
(3.9) (5.0) (6.2) (4.6) (5.7)
- Control 29.5 29.8 29.1 26.1 32.0
(4.1) (5.1) (6.7) (4.6) (6.3)
Eﬀort increased as result of reward
- High reward 0.37 0.43 0.29 0.48 0.30
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
- Low reward 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.32 0.14
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Note: Sample means with standard errors in parentheses.
23the shares of students who respond that the rewards aﬀected their study eﬀort.
Within the sub-samples of students with higher educated fathers, students with
high math skills and students with low math skills, the fractions of students who
say that the reward did have an impact is substantially larger in the high reward
group than in the low reward group. These results provide an explanation for
the heterogeneous treatment eﬀects reported in Table 4. High ability students
and students with higher social backgrounds who can earn a higher reward have
higher achievement because they put more eﬀort (per hour) into their study. Low
ability students who are promised the high reward put more eﬀort into their study
than they would otherwise have done, but apparently this does not boost their
achievement.
The insights gained from the results for various sub-samples readily explain
why we ﬁnd a negligible average treatment eﬀect. Students who can aﬀord to
forgo earnings from part-time work and students for whom the reward require-
ment is feasible increase their (perceived) eﬀort and achieve more. Students for
whom the reward requirements are too demanding and students who cannot af-
ford to reduce the time they work for pay are not responsive to the rewards.
For high ability students and students from a high social background the re-
quirements are obviously feasible. They can aﬀord to forgo earnings from paid
work and increase their (perceived) eﬀort and achieve more. These insights read-
ily explain why we ﬁnd indications for positive treatment eﬀects for some sub-
groups but a negligible average treatment eﬀect.
4.4 Threats to validity
While a randomized experiment is often considered the gold standard in research
on treatment evaluation, it is not without threats to validity of the outcomes.
24Table 6: Incidence and size of supplementary rewards
Incidence rate Mean reward size
High reward 0.104 E770
Low reward 0.025 E750
Control 0.053 E625
Heckman et al. (1999) and Philipson (2000) have drawn attention to the impor-
tance of general equilibrium eﬀects and external treatment eﬀects or spillover
eﬀects. In the context of our experiment at least three confounding factors may
play a role. First there may be treatment substitution bias. Parents may promise
a reward or may supplement the reward if the students are assigned to the con-
trol or low reward group. In this case all participants could be confronted with
essentially the same treatment and we would most likely ﬁnd no diﬀerence be-
tween the original three groups. To investigate whether such responses actually
took place, we included in the post-experiment questionnaire a question whether
someone else (for instance parents) promised a reward for passing all ﬁrst year ex-
ams. Table 6 reports for each group the shares of students responding aﬃrmative
to this question along with the mean values of the size of these supplementary
rewards. The table shows that supplementary rewards are fairly uncommon, and
that incidence rate and size of such rewards are higher among the high reward
group than among the low reward group and the control group. Therefore we
expect supplementary rewards to have no impact on our ﬁndings.
A second possible confounding factor is that teachers may grade exams diﬀer-
ently for students in the reward groups than for students in the control groups.
Although teachers are in principle unaware of the treatment status of their stu-
dents, students could communicate their status in the hope that teachers will
grade their exams more favorably. This seems unlikely for two reasons. First,
25students from the control group could also claim that they belong to a reward
group if this implies that their exam will be graded more favorably.13 A second
and more important reason is that during the ﬁrst academic year most exams are
multiple-choice tests. Such tests give teachers little leeway to manipulate grades
of particular students.
A ﬁnal possible confounding factor is that if the rewards induce students in
the reward groups to work harder, that this could spill over to their peers in
the control group. During the design phase of the experiment we considered the
possibility of a two-stage randomization scheme as proposed by Philipson (2000).
First year students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam
are placed into diﬀerent classes. Students placed in the same class are supposed
to follow the ﬁrst year program together. That means: having the same weekly
schedule, having the same teachers and having the same peers, but the exams are
always the same for all students. In the academic year 2001/2002, there were 9
of such classes. This would allow to ﬁrst assign diﬀerent intensities of treatment
to diﬀerent classes, and then within classes assign students to reward and control
groups.
This two-stage randomization could be undermined by the fact that assign-
ment into classes is not random, but depends on math achievement in secondary
school and the order of application for the economics and business study. The
order of application is likely to be related with students’ motivation. The de-
sign could then lead in practice to unbalanced reward and control groups where
treatment assignment is not orthogonal to unobserved students’ characteristics.
Furthermore, students often do not stay in the class of their original assignment,
thereby generating a similar confounding eﬀect. Finally, a two-stage design would
make it more diﬃcult if not impossible to convince participants that the odds to
26be assigned to one of the reward groups were equal for all.
We consider it unlikely that spillover eﬀects inﬂuenced our ﬁndings. The over-
all passing rate of the students in our experiment is identical to the passing rates
of previous cohorts. Information about student eﬀort from previous cohorts is in
line with student eﬀort among the students that participated in the experiment.
There is also no change in the composition of the student population in terms of
secondary school grades for mathematics.
5. Conclusion
This paper reports about a randomized social experiment that investigated the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on undergraduate students’ achievement. The target
population consists of ﬁrst year economics and business students at the University
of Amsterdam. The students, who were randomized in the reward groups, were
promised a reward upon passing all ﬁrst year exams before the start of their
second academic year. In the high reward group the reward was E681 and in the
low reward group the reward was E227. Students in the control group could not
earn a reward.
The results of the experiment point to a negligible average treatment eﬀect.
Measured by passing rates and collected credit points, students in the reward
groups have the same achievement levels as students in the control group. If we
examine the results for diﬀerent sub-samples, we ﬁnd, however, some evidence
for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. Students possessing good math skills and
students with more highly educated fathers do respond to the rewards. Especially
for students with high math skills, the 0.06 and 0.12 increases in the passing rate
caused by the low and high reward respectively, are substantial.
27The heterogeneous responses also help explain why we ﬁnd an average treat-
ment eﬀect equal to zero. Apparently, only students for whom the reward require-
ment is feasible respond to the incentives. This explanation is similar to that of
Angrist and Lavy (2002), who ﬁnd no (their ﬁrst experiment) or only small (their
second experiment) average treatment eﬀects. The students in their sample come
from a disadvantaged group with very low initial (no reward) passing rates.
In a post-experiment questionnaire, we also collected information on students’
time allocation and study eﬀort. This additional information gives mixed in-
sights. On the one hand, students’ reported study time is not aﬀected by the
rewards. On the other hand, students in the reward groups claim that they
worked harder as a result of the rewards. The pattern of this latter indicator
of eﬀort across sub-samples and treatment groups is consistent with observed
diﬀerences in achievement.
Our experiment was conducted at a Dutch university with a cohort of eco-
nomics and business students. Like with any other social experiment, the extent
to which the results can be generalized to other populations (countries, universi-
ties, groups of students, etc.) or treatments is unclear. Our ﬁnding that ﬁnancial
rewards do not boost average students’ achievements does therefore not imply
that ﬁnancial rewards will never improve students’ achievements. In our inter-
pretation, the reward requirements in the experiment were too demanding for
the average economics and business student in relation to the size of the rewards.
The indicative ﬁnding of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects suggests to us that the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial rewards for students depends crucially on the feasibility
of the requirements for collecting such rewards.
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29Notes
1In the Netherlands, econometrics is a separate undergraduate education from
economics and business.
2The ﬁrst draft of this study circulated only after our experiment started.
3Two other programs that provide ﬁnancial incentives for achievement are the
Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in Britain and the Programa de Am-
pliacion de Cobertura de la Educacion Secundaria (PACES) in Columbia. EMA
gives low-income families a payment for enrollment and achievement. Assignment
to treatment is, however, not random. Dearden et al. (2001, 2002) describe the
evaluation of this program. PACES is a program in which more than 125,000
Columbian pupils received vouchers which covered about half of the cost of pri-
vate secondary school. Vouchers were only renewed for pupils who maintained
satisfactory academic performance (Angrist et al., 2002).
4Students who successfully completed the ﬁrst year in a higher vocational
school can also enter university. These students are a small fraction of the total
inﬂow into university.
5For a few studies students are admitted on the basis of a lottery when the
number of applicants exceeds the number of available places. This is not the case
for the economics and business studies.
6These are: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Free University Amsterdam, Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, University of Groningen, University of Maastricht and
University of Tilburg.
7 Table A1 in the appendix gives an overview of the ﬁrst year courses and the
30number of credit points (weeks) assigned to each course.
8Students can receive 1 credit point dispensation for part of the ﬁnancial
accounting course if they followed a speciﬁc course during secondary education.
9The post-experiment questionnaire also asked students whether they were
still studying economics and business. One quarter of the participants respond
that they dropped out; this share does not diﬀer between reward and control
groups.
10Due to the timing of the experiment one could argue that students’ achieve-
ment on the December exams are pre-program outcomes and use these outcomes
as such. Figure 2 makes clear that reward and control groups perform similar on
both the December exams (pre-program outcomes) and all the subsequent exams
(program outcomes).
11In the ﬁrst trimester 3 respondents report zero study eﬀort, in the second
trimester this equals 33 and in the third trimester 39; 83 students spent zero
hours on preparing for the August make-up exams, of which 22 students did not
have to do any make-up exams. For the sample reporting positive numbers, the
distribution of study time is bell-shaped.
12If the rewards would have increased students’ study time then we would have
been able to estimate the causal eﬀect of study time on achievement. Since the
rewards do not change study time we cannot estimate such an eﬀect. Regressing
the passing rate on study time we ﬁnd that one hour study time extra per week
is associated with a one percent higher passing rate. Adding controls for ability,
social background and the subjective passing rate does not change the size of this
correlation.
3113It is unlikely that teachers demand of students to prove to which group they
belong.




- Financial accounting 4
- Microeconomics 6
- Mathematics 1 3
- Information management A 1
Trimester 2 (January-March)
- Macroeconomics 6
- Management accounting 3
- Orientation ﬁscal economics 1
- Mathematics 2 3






- Information management C 1
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